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The anomalous inverse concentration-price relationship observed by some 
researchers in the newspaper market has been attributed to scale   
economies. In this paper we suggest that the newpaper's (or magazine's) 
"double-product" feature (i.e., news supplied to readers and advertising   
space supplied to advertisers) is the main source of this anomaly. In a   
simple oligopoly model it is shown how a profit-maximizing publisher takes 
advantage of that feature. Empirically an inverse concentration-price 
relationship may arise if double-product pricing is not controlled for. 
Regression results for a cross-section of 222 German newspapers and 
magazines corroborate the theoretical implications. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economic theory tells us that oligopolistic market structures are prone to cause higher prices  
and lower output than less concentrated markets. A huge body of empirical studies has been 
presented in the literature testing the structure-performance hypothesis across industries or 
firms. Due to data problems most of the studies had to rely on price-cost margins or some 
other measure of profitability as indicators of pricing behavior and performance. Only a 
handful of studies looked at prices directly, starting with George Stigler's famous article "A 
Theory of Oligopoly" [1964]. Leonard Weiss [1989], weighing own pioneering results and 
previous findings by other researchers, found overwhelming empirical support for the 
prediction of standard oligopoly theory, namely that concentration raises price. Yet some 
anomalies remained, e.g. concerning the newspaper market where monopolization seemingly 
did not raise prices at all. A bit puzzled Weiss [1989, p. 270] concluded: "Newspapers are 
clearly a special case. Huge economies of long production runs, the role of circulation in 
selling advertising, and the importance of at least local ads in selling papers all point to low 
monopoly prices! ... I don't know of any other unregulated industry that yields anything like 
that.” 
This paper tries to cope with that puzzle. It is organized as follows. Section II discusses the 
pecularities of the market for newspapers and magazines and briefly reviews the previous 
literature. In section III we formulate a static profit maximisation model to derive implications 
about the pricing behavior of a newspaper publisher who caters to readers and advertisers 
under an oligopoly market structure. Using an unique set of data on 222 German newspapers 
and magazines for 1997 in Section IV we present regression results which shed light on the 
impact of economies of scale and scope as well as of market power on cover prices and 
advertising rates. We close with some tentative conclusions in section V. 
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2. Scale Economies, Competition, and Prices 
 
A key feature of newspaper and magazine production is the existence of a large block of fixed 
costs. Costs for maintaining printing facilities, editorial staff, news gathering etc. do not vary 
with circulation. Consequently, a higher circulation leads to decreasing total unit costs (cf. 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission [1996]). If scale economies are very pronounced the 
extent of the market crucially limits the number of viable competitors. In the extreme, with 
unit costs falling over the whole circulation range, a monopolist will have the lowest possible 
unit costs. This argument is used in the literature to explain and justify the generally observed 
market structure of only one newspaper publisher per city (see e.g. Reimer [1992]). 
Monopolization of the (geographically delineated) newspaper market is thus seen as a 
necessary prerequisite for degression of fixed costs. Due to his cost advantage a monopoly 
publisher is able to charge lower cover prices and prices for advertising space than publishers 
under more competitive (e.g. oligopolistic) market structures who have higher unit costs. 
Competitive pressure from other information and advertising transmitters like TV and radio is 
expected to force the (local) monopoly publisher to pass cost savings on to readers and 
advertisers likewise. 
However, technical progress not only in printing technology but also in computers and 
software (e.g. desk top publishing) has been undermining the natural monopoly argument. 
Norton and Norton [1986] report that due to new technologies medium size US publishers 
with a circulation of 10,000 to 100,000 units per issue gained market shares in the period 1964 
to 1981 while market shares of large scale suppliers stagnated and very small publishers (with 
a circulation of 5,000 units per issue and less) exited. The importance of fixed cost degression 
and the need for monopoly may therefore be overstated. 
Heinrich [1994, pp. 215-218] analysed the cost structure of German newspapers and 
magazines using aggregated data due to lacking firm-level data. In 1990 fixed costs of 
newspaper production (magazine production) amounted to 52.9 (38) percent of total revenues 
on average, the share of costs that vary with circulation was only about 34 (46) percent. The 
remaining share fell to miscellaneous costs and gross profit which was 6 (5.3) percent of total 
revenues. Labour costs amounted to almost 75 (60) percent of total fixed costs. Comparing 
these aggregated and unweighted averages with the averages of the German manufacturing  
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sector one can indeed conclude that the fixed cost burden is bigger in the newspaper and  
magazine publishing industry.
1 
There are at least two reasons why advertising rates, the price charged for standardized space 
of advertisement (e.g. price of column inch per 1,000 units), should decrease as circulation is 
raised. First, because of fixed costs unit costs decrease. Second, since the so-called base price 
for placing an advertisement is observed to rise at a decreasing rate with circulation
2, the 
advertisers' willingness-to-pay should decrease, i.e., price-elasticity of demand for advertising 
space should increase. 
Stigler [1964] used a 1939 cross-section of 53 US-cities that had one or two daily newspapers. 
He found a significant negative relationship between the log of advertising rate and the log of 
circulation. The estimated coefficient was greater than unity indicating the existence of scale 
economies. Further, in two-newspaper towns advertising rates were lower than the sample 
average and higher in one-newspaper towns. In other words, competition from an independent 
newspaper lowered prices charged for advertising space.  
Rosse [1967, 1970], Dertouzos and Trautman [1990] and Reimer [1992] also reported strong 
evidence of scale economies for differing samples of US daily newspapers. In stark contrast to 
Stigler, Reimer found monopolization to make advertisers better off. Advertising rates 
charged by monopoly newspapers were not higher than under (duopolistic) competition. This 
result is corroborated by the study of Ferguson [1983] who had by far the largest sample at 
hand (covering 94% of the total daily US newspaper circulation). However, chain ownership  
of newspapers raised advertising rates significantly, whereas local newspaper-television cross- 
ownership and competition from independent local broadcast stations lowered rates. On the  
                                                 
1 The average firm in German manufacturing in 1990 had a variable costs share of 54 percent, a labour costs 
share of 24.7 percent, about 10 percent other fixed costs (taxes, interest payments etc.) and 4.3 percent gross 
profit. Taking the services sector and construction into account the variable cost share increases to 63.3 percent, 
the labour costs share decreases to 19.2 percent, other fixed costs amount to about 7.7 percent and gross profit 
drops to 3.5 percent. (Source: Deutsche Bundesbank [1993, pp. 20-23], own calculations)  
2 See Heinrich [1994, p. 290] who reports average base prices and advertising rates for a standard one-page black 
& white advertisement in 1990. For example, magazines with a circulation of 5,000 to 10,000 charged a base 
price of DM 2,156 while magazines with a circulation above 500,000 charged DM 27,585. The respective 
advertising rates (defined as pages sold×base price/circulation) were DM 302.50 and DM 19.50.   5
contrary, Dertouzos and Trautman [1990] concluded that competition for readers and 
advertisers resulted from rivaling newspapers, not from broadcast stations. Further, chain 
ownership had no efficiency enhancing (cost reducing) impact. 
In a cross-section regression analysis of Australian magazines Round and Bentick [1997] 
studied the determinants of price discounts offered to subscribers. The coefficient on the 
competition variable (number of rivaling magazines in a given title's similar interest category) 
was positive throughout their four different specifications, and at least highly significant in 
one specification, implying that magazines compete for readers via subscription prices. 
Interpreting cover price as a proxy for individual market power they found a positive 
coefficient which was insignificant in three of four specifications. However, taking market 
segmentation into account a highly significant negative coefficient emerged in two of four 
segmentation groups, implying that publishers with market power offer less favorable 
discounts in these groups. 
Summing up, there is sound empirical evidence in the existing literature for price reducing 




3. Double-Product Pricing and Market Power 
 
Publishers of newspapers or magazines offer (at least) two distinct, but interrelated products 
simultaneously and receive revenues from these different sources. Firstly, they sell printed 
information (or entertainment) to their readership. Secondly, and jointly, they sell the 
opportunity to advertise. Moreover, these publishers are increasingly real multi-product firms 
producing more than one title in different market segments like news or lifestyle while, in 
addition, being strategically diversified into books, TV and/or radio. Pricing behaviour of 
publishers in a single market segment is then likely to result from some form of joint profit 
maximization taking advantage of dependent demands between supplied products. For 
example, cover prices of a magazine in one market segment could be held low and constant 
even in the case of monopolization to secure a high circulation while cover prices and/or 
prices charged for advertising are held well above unit costs in other market segments. 
To our knowledge, Corden [1953] was the first to study the issue of profit maximisation by a 
newspaper. The point of analytical interest is that the "amount sold of the first product", the    6
circulation of the newspaper, "determines the quality of the second", the space offered and 
demanded for advertising (Corden [1953, p. 183]). Thus the pricing of the two products may 
be linked, namely by the circulation of the newspaper. Corden's graphical analysis was 
formalized to some extent by Rosse [1970] and Dertouzos and Trautman [1990] who assumed 
a publisher operating under a monopolistic or monopolistically competitive market structure. 
In this paper, however, we will focus on oligopoly to clarify the relationship between pricing 
behaviour and publisher concentration. 
Suppose the publisher produces a single newspaper or magazine. Let n be the space which is 
devoted to news in each issue, s the respective space reserved for advertising, and finally 
 the newspaper's total space. There is no uncertainty with respect to demand and 
costs, i.e., demand curves of readers and advertisers are known to the publisher. The produced 
circulation  q can be sold completely. Consider a homogenous oligopoly with 
s n : v + =
N ,..., i 1 =  
publishers. A publisher's profit π is then given by 
(1)   i i i i i i i F ) v , q ( C s ) S , Q ( a q ) V , Q ( p − − + = π , 
where p is the newspapers' cover price depending on market circulation Q and total 
newspaper space V , a is the base price of advertising being determined by market 
circulation (as an indicator of coverage) and total advertising space  , C is variable 






















Profit is maximised by choice of q, n and s if the following first-order conditions hold: 
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, conditions (3) and (4) can be combined to yield 






s a i . 
Let us assume  0 < ∂ ∂ Q / p ,  ,  0 > ∂ ∂ V / p 0 > ∂ ∂ i i q / C  and  0 > ∂ ∂ i i v / C leaving open for  









: p ε  as the cover price elasticity of readership demand,  as the 
individual share in total circulation and 







=  as marginal costs of circulation equation 

















The left-hand side of (6) gives the Lemer index of selling the newspaper. However, the 
publisher's ability to price above marginal cost is not determined solely by the price elasticity 
of demand but also by the partial impact of total circulation on the price of advertising. To 
develop this partial derivative a little more we can make use of condition (5). Under Coumot 
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Assuming that, at given advertising demand, more advertising space can only be sold at a 
lower price,  , and further, for simplicity, that this relationship is linear, i.e., 
, we have  
0 < ∂ ∂ S / a
0


















Moreover, base prices for advertising space are empirically observed to rise with circulation 
(see above Sec. 2 and footnote 2), so we may assume  0 > ∂ ∂ Q / a . Since  and 
 by assumption, 
0 > ∂ ∂ Q / a









denote the price 










: η  the circulation-elasticity of advertising 
demand,   the relation of revenues from selling advertising space to revenues 
from selling the newspaper and 
i i pq / as := i k
S s : m i si = the publisher's share in the advertising market. 

















We may assume 1 0 < < i η , i.e., demand for advertising space increases in circulation, but at  
a decreasing rate.
3 Looking at (8), the first term on the right-hand side represents the standard 
result of Coumot oligopoly, i.e., the publisher's ability to set the cover price above marginal 
costs is positively related to his market share and inversely related to the price elasticity of 
readership demand. The interesting point, however, is that market power in selling the   
                                                 
3 Advertising space should increase, because a larger number of readers makes the newspaper more attractive for 
advertisers so that demand for advertising space rises. However, heterogeneity of readers tends to rise as well 
with the level of circulation, since profiles and boundaries of target groups for advertisers become increasingly 
diffuse, generating loss of coverage. Further, competition from other suppliers of advertising space may increase, 
raising the price elasticity of advertisers (see above Sec. II). Advertising   
space thus can only be extended at a decreasing rate. This assumption is empirically plausible. Within a 
simultaneous equations framework Dertouzos and Trautman [1990, p.9, table II]) estimated an elasticity of 0.82. 
See also Heinrich [1994, pp. 212] for informal evidence.   9
newspaper is not fully exercised due to the existence of a second source of market power. 










In order to sell advertising space publishers choose a higher circulation which, at given 










The more market power a publisher commands in selling advertising space, the lower cover 
price will be set, all else equal. Market power in selling advertising space depends on a 
publisher's market share m , price elasticity of advertising demand as well as on k, the 
relation of revenues from advertising to revenues from selling the newspaper, and on the 
circulation-elasticity of advertising demand.
4 The pricing behaviour resulting from our model 
resembles that of the textbook multi-product firm taking advantage of dependent demands 
arising with complements (cf. Tirole [1988, p. 70]). In the model presented here the existence 
of a second source of revenues fulfills the same purpose.
5 
si
Analogous to the standard one-product case (cf. Cowling and Waterson [1976], Clarke and 
Davies [1982]) supplier concentration can be integrated into (8) (see Appendix A for details). 
Assuming, for simplicity, a symmetric Cournot oligopoly as well as k and η to be identical 
constants for all i we obtain 













                                                 
4 In 1990, the share of advertising revenues in total revenues was on average 64.8 percent for daily newspapers, 
62.8 percent for current affairs magazines and 42.1 percent for general interest titles (Heinrich [1994, pp 209, 
284]). 
5 Note, however, that the two products offered by the publisher are not complements from the readers' or 
advertisers' point of view.   10
where   is the standard Herfindahl concentration index with respect to the 
readership market and   is sort of a Herfindahl index reflecting market share 














si qim m : K
1
Equation (9) describes an equilibrium relationship between a publisher's power to raise cover 
price above marginal costs and publisher concentration. Let  p ε ,  a ε ,  k and η in (9) be 
determined exogenously and independently of H. How does a change in concentration impact 
on the individual Lemer index? In spite of the simplifications made, there is no clear-cut 

























cannot be signed unambigiously. With k, ηand  a ε  being positive constants the sign of (10a) 
depends on  H / K ∂ ∂ which may be positive or negative due to actual market share 
constellations in both markets.
6 If  0 ≤ ∂ ∂ H / K , the Lerner index in the readership market is 
positively related to publisher concentration. For  0 > ∂ ∂ H / K  we may also expect a positive 









η . This condition is satisfied for  a ε  being sufficiently greater than 
p ε .
7 However, for  p a ε ε <  we may find a negative concentration-price relationship. 
                                                 
6 Suppose duopoly markets. Let the initial market share distribution be (0.5, 0.5) in both the readership market 
and the advertising market. Correspondingly, we have H = 0.5 and   
K = 0.5. Now let shares in the readership market change to (0.7, 0.3) while shares in the advertising market 
remain unchanged. We then observe that a higher concentration in the readership market, namely H=0.58, does 
not change K. However, if we assume an initial share distribution in the advertising market of (0.4, 0.6) instead 
of (0.5, 0.5), which gives   
K = 0.5 as well, we will observe a lower K (0.46) after H has changed, all else equal. Contrarily, if we assume 
(0.6, 0.4) instead of (0.4, 0.6), K is raised to 0.54 by the assumed change in H. A still more uneven distribution 
like (0.8, 0.2) will lead to more than a proportional change of K when H changes. 
7 Suppose the following parameter constellation: k = 0.648 and η =0.82, the empirical   
values reported in footnotes 4 and 5 above, δK/δH = 1 and εp = 2. Under these conditions a   
slighly higher price elasticity of advertising demand, e.g. εa =2.13, will suffice to render (l0a) positive. 
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At given market share distribution in the readership market an increase in K, due to changes of 
market shares in the advertising market, has an unambigiously negative impact on the Lerner 
index in the readership market, since 




















The simple model presented here demonstrates that concentration-price relationships in 
newspaper and magazine publishing may be far more complex due to what might be called 
double-product pricing than expected. An empirical model ignoring this issue, i.e., starting 
from eq. (8a) instead of eq. (9), may entail anomalous results because of misspecification. The 
concentration index concerning the readership market may then also reflect market power 
exercised in selling advertising space. 
With some additional effort the model might be extended to incorporate demand uncertainty 
in order to highlight the role of subscriptions. Subscriptions ensure a minimum level of sales 
so that the publisher is able to plan production with greater certainty.
8 From this perspective, 
cover prices should be lower under more certainty. However, if publishers compete mainly via 
subscriptions cover prices might be raised or held at high levels to have leeway for high 
subscription discounts which may be a good incentive for readers to subscribe or renew a 
subscription. Moreover, with high subscriptions there is only a relatively small and fluctuating 
residual readership. High cover prices may then be used as a signalling device for quality of 
content. For advertisers a larger number of subscribers means a higher opportunity to reach 
readers. Newspapers or magazines that have a higher subscriber rate should therefore have a 
higher demand for advertising space and, at a given circulation, a higher advertising rate. 
4. Data and empirical results 
The discussion in section II and the theoretical model presented in section III leads to the 
following hypotheses for our empirical investigation. 
                                                 
8 See also Glazer and Hazin [1982].   12
1. Since scale economies are pervasive a higher circulation leads to lower cover prices and 
advertising rates, (cf. sec. II, Stigler [1964], Rosse [1967, 1970], Dertouzos and Trautman 
[1990], Reimer [1992])  
2. Chain ownership (multi-title publishing) enhances market power and thus raises prices, (cf. 
sec. II, Ferguson [1983])  
3. The impact of concentration, as a measure of oligopolistic market power, on the price of 
advertising should be positive. The respective influence on cover price may be either 
positive or negative. It should be positive, however, if double-product pricing is controlled 
for (cf. model in sec. III).  
4. A high (absolute or relative) number of subscriptions raises demand for advertising space 
and, at a given circulation, the advertising rate. The impact on cover price cannot be signed 
unambigiously. (cf. sec. III) 
To test these hypotheses a data set is used that comprises 222 German newspapers and 
magazines which have a national coverage and a circulation of 100,000 or more units per 
issue in 1997.
9 More than half of those titles are published monthly, more than a quarter 
weekly. Though we identified 72 different publishers, 54.5 percent of all sample titels and 
73.2 percent of the total sample circulation are accounted for by only nine publishers. Four of 
these leading publishers are media giants with diversification into TV and annual revenues of 
more than DM 1,500 Mio (see Appendix B, Tables A-l to A-3 for details).  
Following the standard classification of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Media-Analyse (AG Media-
Analyse [1993, pp. VIII]) the sample titles can be grouped into 16 homogenous market 
segments or similar interest categories ranging from daily newspapers, current affairs 
magazines, sports magazines to women's magazines and special interest titles like home and 
gardening (cf. Appendix B, Table A-4). It was possible to calculate the cumulated share of the 
leading three publishers (C3) in total circulation in each of these categories. The concentration 
ratio is supposed to measure the strength of competition for readership in the respective 
 
                                                 
9 All titles marketed nation-wide with cover price > 0 are included. We did not consider membership magazines, 
for which we have data on advertising rates, because they are not sold. Individual data on titles with lower 
circulation and regional distribution were not available.   13
category. Unfortunately, we do not have any concentration data with respect to the advertising 
market yet.
10 
To allow for comparability of prices charged for advertising space across the heterogenous 
sample we use the price of an ad supplement (ad special with a weight up to 25 gram) per 
1,000 units. We will call this variable the advertising rate (ADV). We take the cover price per 
issue (PRICE) as the relevant price for the readership.
11 Since there are no individual cost  
data available, we use total circulation per issue (CIRC) as a proxy variable for scale 
economies assuming that unit costs of production decrease in circulation. Subscriber 
circulation (SUB) may stand for certainty in planning production as well as for the 
opportunity of advertisers to reach readers. 
Market segmentation and the occupation of niches is a special feature of the market for 
magazines. We have 16 similar interest categories that differ in part decisively by content, 
layout, print quality, and price. In principle, we could integrate product differentiation in our 
empirical model by assigning a binary variable to each group. However, the number of 
variables would rise considerably reducing the degrees of freedom for estimating parameters 
of interest. Thus we aggregated the 16 segmentation groups into four groups that may account 
for differing informational demands of readers (cf. Appendix B, Table A-4). Group 1 (NEWS) 
represents daily newspapers (like Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) and current affairs 
magazines (like Der Spiegel) which cover politics, international affairs etc. Group 2 (KNOW 
HOW) comprises magazines which require a specific knowledge base (electronics, 
photography, computers, arts, science, business and finance). Group 3 (WOMEN & 
LIFESTYLE) includes magazines which have specialized on topics relating to women, 
teenagers, erotic or lifestyle (like Playboy). Each group is represented by a dummy variable 
                                                 
10 We are currently collecting more detailed data on each title in the sample concerning space devoted to news 
and advertising per issue. Aggregating these data in each market segment will give us at least a lower bound of 
total space devoted to news and advertising   
so it might be possible to include a concentration index with respect to advertising space in future research. 
11 Cover prices are reported to be very sticky (see the discussion in Round and Bentick [1997]), even over longer 
stretches of time, but for German newspapers Heinrich [1994, p. 221] shows that cover prices as well as 
subscriber prices increased in the period 1980-1990 significantly more than the consumer price index. 
Unfortunately, we have not managed yet to collect comparable subscription rates for the greater part of our 
sample. Analysis of pricing behavior via offering subscription discounts has to be left for future research.   14
that takes the value of one if a certain title belongs to the group, otherwise its value is zero. 
These three groups will be tested against the remaining magazines, our control group (REST), 
that focus on topics like TV guiding, home and gardening, sports etc.  
Chain ownership or multi-title publishing may entail economies of scope resulting from lower 
overhead costs (due to sharing joint inputs in printing, distribution, newsgathering, 
management etc.) and lower risk premiums if they are strategically diversified into different 
market segments. However, occupying different market segments can enhance market power 
by depriving readership of an independent supplier. We constructed a dummy variable 
(SCOPE) which takes unit value if the respective title is published by a multi-title publisher, 
otherwise it has zero value. As multi-title publisher we defined one who operates in more 
market segments than the median publisher and/or produces more titles. The median publisher 
in our sample offers six titles in three different market segments. Summary statistics of the 




Variable Mea  Std.d.  Media  Max  Min 
 n  ev.  n     
Advertising Rate (ADV) (in DM)   131.8 41.1 120.0  300.0  56.0
Cover Price (PRICE) (in DM)  5.5 3.3 5.0  20.0  1.1
Circulation (CIRC)  371 489 182  2745  27
 984 316 023  469  611
Subscribers (SUB)  88 167 33  1420  372
 397 547 133  869 
Concentration (C3) (per cent)  61.1 13.4 55.9  88.9  39.1
Titles per Publisher  11.6 11.01 6  30  1
Market Segments per Publisher  4.6 3.6 3  11  1
Sources: see Appendix A  
 
In the first part of our regression analysis we estimate the coefficients of the following log-
linear base models by OLS 
(11)   log  logC 1 b a ADV + = 2 3 b + logCIRC+u, 
   15
(12)   log logC logCIRC+u.  1 b a PRICE + = 2 3 b +
Taking each equation for its own and ignoring possible double-product pricing the empirical 
models (11) and (12) can be interpreted as plausible ad hoc specifications implied by the 
standard structure-performance framework. The base models are extended in further 
specification trials by the variables log SUB and SCOPE as well as the target group variables 
NEWS, KNOW HOW and WOMEN & LIFESTYLE. Results are shown in Table II. 
Table II 
DETERMINANTS OF COVER PRICE AND ADVERTISING RATE  
IGNORING DOUBLE PRODUCT PRICING 
OLS Estimation 
  Dependent     Variable:     log  Dependent     Variable:      log
  ADV PRICE   
Independent Variable  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
log C3  0.218*** 0.100* -0.181  - 
 (3.12)  (1.71)  (1.07)  0.357** 
     (2.55) 
log  CIRC  - - - - 
  0.096*** 0.112*** 0.350*** 0.419*** 
 (6.07)  (5.29)  (11.85)  (10.01) 
log SUB    0.042***   0.134***
   (3.23)    (5.11) 
SCOPE  0.094**   0.143**
   (2.80)    (2.14) 
NEWS  0.161**   - 
   (2.12)    0.350*** 
     (2.64) 
KNOW HOW    0.223***   0.417***
   (4.99)    (5.19) 
WOMEN & LIFESTYLE    -    -0.043
   0.101**    (0.58) 
   (2.17)     
Constant  6.124*** 5.763*** 5.719*** 4.985***
  (29.18) (27.08) (14.40) (11.69) 
adj. R2  0.121 0.334 0.364  0.528
Heteroscedasticity-consistent absolute t-values (White) in parantheses; 
* (**, ***} 90 (95, 99) %-significance level (two-tailed test) 
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First look at the advertising rate regressions (columns i and ii). As expected from our 
discussion in section II, we observe a significantly negative impact of circulation on the 
advertising rate. Scale economies of larger circulation allow for lower advertising rates. The 
coefficient, which gives the elasticity of the advertising rate with respect to circulation, is 
clearly smaller than unity, i.e., advertising rates fall at a decreasing rate with increasing 
circulation.  
The coefficient on concentration is significantly positive in each specification. In accordance 
with oligopoly theory a higher combined market share of the largest three publishers in the 
respective market segment raises advertising rates. Adding subscriptions, scope and the target 
group variables improves the fit of the model. The impact of concentration, however, is 
reduced to more than half. Both scope und subscriptions affect advertsing rates positively and 
significantly. We attribute the price raising effect of chain ownership, also found by Ferguson 
[1983], to enhanced market power.
12 The positive coefficient on subscriptions supports the 
hypothesis that the demand for advertising increases in the guaranteed number of readers, 
since the opportunity to reach readers increases. 
Market segmentation leads to discrimination of advertising rates. Compared to our 
heterogenous control group REST advertising rates are significantly higher in the NEWS and 
KNOW HOW groups and significantly lower in WOMEN & LIFESTYLE. NEWS and 
KNOW HOW groups have a clientele with salient features well-known to advertisers.
13 Titles 
from these groups are especially attractive for advertisers. For a more precise coverage they 
are willing to pay higher prices for advertising space. On the contrary, the profile of readers in  
WOMEN & LIFESTYLE is much more diffuse and losses of coverage are greater.  
Now look at the cover price regressions (columns iii and iv) which display the most 
interesting result in Table II. Concentration is found to have a negative impact on cover price. 
This effect is highly significant in the extended model specification. Here we meet with the  
 
                                                 
12 Alternatively, we defined SCOPE to be one if the publisher produces more than one title, and to be zero for a 
single-title publisher. Instead of using a binary variable, we also took the total number of titles produced by each 
publisher as a proxy for scope. In both cases, the estimated coefficients used to be positive throughout the 
various regressions without ever reaching conventionally assumed significance levels. 
13 Research by AG Media-Analyse [1993] shows that these groups have a readership with relatively high 
household income, a high share of white collar workers holding senior positions and a high coverage (readers per 
page).   17
sort of anomaly Weiss [1989, p. 270] had wondered about. The other coefficients have the 
expected signs. A higher circulation allows for lower cover price, whereas a larger number of 
subscribers raise cover price. Again, as with advertising rates, the coefficient on SCOPE is 
positive. Cover prices are significantly lower in the NEWS group and significantly higher in 
the KNOW HOW group than in our control group. This pattern is very plausible when 
recalling that today's news is old news tomorrow, while information transmitted in the 
KNOW HOW group has a different quality and does not become obsolete so fast. The fit of 
the model is relatively good for a cross-section analysis. To get a better picture of the impact 
of concentration we re-estimated the model for each of the informational segmentation groups 
and the control group separately. Table III contains these results. 
Table III 
SUBSAMPLE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE COVER PRICE EQUATION  
Extended Model, OLS Estimation 
  Informational Segmentation Groups 
            Independent 
Variable 
NEWS  KNOW HOW WOMEN & 
LIFESTYLE 
REST 
log C3  -0.980  0.416*  0.990***  -0.519*** 
  (1.61) (1.69) (3.01) (3.21) 
log CIRC  -0.069  -0.046  -0.501***  -0.495*** 
  (0.34) (0.33) (7.25) (11.29) 
log SUB  0.038  -0.052  0.184***  0.147*** 
  (0.22) (0.65) (5.48) (4.57) 
SCOPE -0.151  0.355***  0.164  0.074 
  (0.88) (2.77) (1.44) (0.84) 
Constant  -0.567  3.272*** 6.165*** 5.694*** 
  (0.51) (3.03) (8.34) (12.57) 
adj.  R2  0.118 0.128 0.430 0.619 
F (zero slopes)  1.67  2.43*  12.85***  40.05*** 
N  22 40 63 97 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent absolute t-values (White) inparantheses; 
* (* *,***) 90 (95, 99) %-significance level (two-tailed test) 
 
Due to the small number of observations coefficient estimations in the NEWS and KNOW 
HOW group are not very reliable with respect to t-values and F-statistics, whereas the 
coefficients in WOMEN & LIFESTYLE and in the control group could be estimated very  
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precisely. Nevertheless, concentration seems to have a totally different impact on cover prices 
depending on the market segment that is analysed. Cover prices are raised significantly by 
concentration in WOMEN & LIFESTYLE and also in KNOW HOW. In the NEWS group 
and in the REST group we find a negative impact that is highly significant in the latter. 
The theoretical model presented above highlighted the issue of double-product pricing which 
entails an interrelated influence of market share distributions in both markets on pricing 
behaviour in the readership market. To cope with double-product pricing we estimate the 
following regression model  
(13)   log logC 1 b a PRICE + = 2 3 b + logCIRC+ log 3 b × 3 C logADV+u, 
where the interactive variable log × 3 C logADV is supposed to control for interrelated   
market power effects. Partial derivation of (13) with respect to concentration reveals the direct 
and indirect effects of concentration on cover price 










The influence of market power in the advertising market on the concentration-cover price 
relationship is given by the cross partial derivative 









The theoretical model (cf eqs. 9, 10a,b) predicts that at given publisher's market power 
towards advertisers and given costs (proxied by logCIRC), cover price should be positively 
related to concentration in the readership market (proxied by logC3). This relationship, 
however, may be weakened and possibly reversed due to double-product pricing by market 
power in the advertising market (proxied by logADV). In case of double-product pricing we 
would thus expect to find empirically b1 > 0 and b3 < 0. Table 4 presents the results of 
estimating (13) and its variants. Column (i) gives the results for equation (13) while column 
(ii) refers to the extended model. To check for possible simultaneity bias in column (iii) we 
have applied an instrumental variable (IV) approach which treats the advertising rate as 
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endogenously determined by the set of exogenous variables log C3, log SUB, SCOPE, 
NEWS, KNOW HOW and WOMEN & LIFESTYLE.
14 
Table IV 
DETERMINANTS OF THE COVER PRICE UNDER DOUBLE-PRODUCT PRICING  
OLS and Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation 
Independent Variable  (i) OLS  (ii) OLS  (iii) IV 
log C3  5.342***  3.234***  7.664* 
  (6.06) (3.41) (1.88) 
log CIRC  -0.301***  -0.378***  -0.306*** 
 (10.55)  (8.75)  (4.77) 
log C3 × log ADV  -1.171*** -0.754***  -1.682* 
  (6.34) (3.74) (1.99) 
log SUB    0.115***  0.087** 
   (4.04)  (2.19) 
SCOPE   0.101   
   (1.52)   
NEWS   -0.381***  -0.448*** 
   (2.91)  (3.07) 
KNOW HOW    0.353***  0.247** 
   (4.29)  (2.23) 
WOMEN & LIFESTYLE    -0.004   
   (0.05)   
Constant  5.045*** 4.672*** 4.122*** 
  (13.01) (11.10) (7.86) 
adj. R2  0.443  0.555  - 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent absolute t-values (White) in parantheses; 
* (**, ***) 90 (95, 99) %-significance level (two-tailed test) 
 
The theoretical predictions are fully borne out by the estimation results. Concentration has 
now a significantly positive impact on cover price throughout. The coefficient of the 
interaction variable is significantly negative in all specifications. The total partial impact of 
concentration, given by (14a) is negative in each specification.
15 Sign patterns and   
                                                 
14 To satisfy the rank order condition for identification SCOPE and WOMEN &   
LIFESTYLE have been dropped from the cover price equation. 
15 Inserting the estimated coefficients into (14a) and evaluating logADV at its sample mean log 131.8 = 4.88 
yields a combined partial effect of -0.372 in (i), -0.446 in (ii) and -0.544 in (iii).   20
significance levels of the other coefficients remain unchanged, except for SCOPE which is 
insignificant now. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Leonard Weiss was right. Newspapers are really a special case. The pecularity of newspaper 
and magazine publishing lies in the fact that a publisher caters to two different demands 
simultaneously, i.e., readers' demand for news or entertainment and advertisers' demand for 
advertising space. Selling news to the readership is intertwined via circulation with selling 
advertising space to advertisers. As the foregoing research suggests, pricing behaviour is 
affected by this pecularity resulting in what we have called double-product pricing. 
Under double-product pricing cover prices are influenced by the extent of a publisher's market 
power in supplying advertising space. Without market power in selling advertising space a 
publisher's ability to set cover price above marginal costs depends solely on the market 
structure in the readership market (e.g. concentration, scale economies) and on the price 
elasticity of readership demand, as predicted by standard oligopoly theory. Market power in 
selling advertising space opens up the possibility to "subsidize" cover prices. Compared with 
the one-product case under double-product pricing cover price may be set the lower the more 
market power the publisher can exercise in the advertising market. Even pricing below 
marginal costs to drive smaller competitors out of the readership market may be profit 
maximizing if the share of revenues from selling advertising space in total revenues is 
comparably large. 
If double-product pricing is not controlled for in empirical studies one may find an inverse 
concentration-price relationship and conclude erroneously that monopolization is beneficial 
because of lower cover prices. The theoretical and empirical results presented in this paper 
suggest, however, that the detrimental impact of monopolization may simply arise in the 
advertising market instead. Advertising rates were found to rise with concentration and also 
with the extent of multi-title publishing. Moreover, after controlling for double-product 
pricing a cover price-raising direct impact of concentration turned up as well. Thus by taking 
account of the double-product pecularity standard oligopoly theory suffices to solve the 
puzzle of an inverse concentration-price relationship in newspaper and magazine publishing. 
Further, our empirical results confirm the findings of Stigler and others regarding the price- 
reducing impact of scale economies.    21
Appendix A 
 
Multiplying both sides of text equation (8) with m  and aggregating over i yields  qi







































c  is average marginal cost. For a more compact representation of (i) define 
 as the Herfindahl index with respect to the readership market and, assuming k and  =
i
: H
η to be identical constants for all i,   as an index reflecting market share 
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Define the left-hand side of (8) as  ( ) p C p : L q i − = and the left-hand side of (ii) as 






i − − = 1 1.  
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Data on advertising rates, total circulation, subscriber circulation, issue frequency and 
affiliation to similar interest groups (market segmentation) were kindly provided to us by the 
Deutsche Post AG. Own research was necessary to find out cover price and publisher for each 








PUBLICATION FREQUENCY – SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION 
 
Publication frequency  Numb
er 
% 
daily 7  3.1 
weekly 59  26.6 
biweekly 20  9.0 
monthly 117  52.7 
quarterly 18  8.1 
biannual 1  0.5 
Total 222  100 
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Table A-2 












Different "similar  
interest categories" 
(Total=16) 
Heinrich Bauer Verlag KG  30  13.5  27.8  9 
Gruner + Jahr AG  27  25.6  37.8  11 
Axel Springer AG  16  32.8  53.9  7 
Verlagsgruppe Burda  12  38.2  62.1  5 
Jahreszeiten-Verlag 9  42.3  65.0  5 
Motor Press Stuttgart  9  46.4  69.9  2 
Mediengesellschaft mbH  7  49.6  69.6  3 
Gong Verlag  6  52.3  72.7  3 
Verlagsgruppe Milchstraße  5  54.5  73.2  4 
8 Publishers  4  67.1  84.3  2* 
5 Publishers  3  73.8  87.3  3* 
9 Publishers  2  81.9  89.5  2* 
41 Publishers  1  100  100  1 
* Median   24
 
Table A-3 
THE BIGGEST GERMAN PUBLISHERS OF NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINES 
 
Publisher  Relevant Shareholders   Revenues
1 
  (shares in percent)  Advertising  Circulation 
Gruner + Jahr AG 




2,3 Bertelsmann-Foundation  68.8  988.2  n.a. 
Burda Group 
2,3  Dr Hubert Burda  892.1  181.7 
Axel Springer AG 
2,3 Kirch-Group  40.05  746.9  124.0 
Heinrich Bauer Verlag 
2,3 Bauer  (family)  554.3  231.5 
Spiegel-Verlag  Gruner + Jahr AG 24.75  441.3  25.1 
Jahr-Group Jahr  (family)  347.7  n.a. 
Verlagsgruppe Milchstrasse   Burda (via BRV Burda Rizolli 80.0) 321.2  37.1 
Vereinigte Motor-Verlage  Vogel Medien-Group 40.0  276.0  39.0 
  Gruner + Jahr AG 15.0     
Kirch-Group  Dr Leo Kirch and family  261.3  n.a. 
Holtzbrinck  von Holtzbrinck (family)  181.6  n.a. 
Vogel Medien-Group  Vogel (family)  145.1  17.8 
1 from newspapers and magazines only, in Mio. DM 
2 diversification into TV 
3 total revenues in 1996 DM 1,500 Mio and more 
 
Sources: Media & Marketing [1997] (ownership structures, advertising revenues), own calculations 
(revenues from circulation). 
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Table A-4 
TITLES AND INFORMATIONAL SEGMENTATION GROUPS 
 
 
Group titles  Homogenous  sub-group  titles 
NEWS 22  newspapers  10 
    current affairs magazines  12 
KNOW HOW  40  electronics, foto, video, music  9 
   arts,  science  8 
   computers,  software  14 
   business  &  finance  9 
WOMEN & LIFESTYLE  63  women  44 
   teenage  10 
   lifestyle  9 
REST (Control Group)  97  TV guides  14 
    home & gardening  21 
   health  9 
   motoring  19 
   sports  20 
    tourism & travel  7 
   animals  7 
 222   222 
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